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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the issue of optimal procedure for information transmission in a
multiagent situation. Much of the information used in decision making is dispersed within
agents and they are often much better informed than a principal. However, each agent
knows only a fraction of the relevant information. I study what kind of communication
procedure induces good decision making under such environment. This paper develops an
economic theory of strategic information transmission within the multiagent framework.
Consider the executive of a video game machine company such as Play Station, X-box
and Nintendo, who has to make a decision about the quality of new model. She has a variety
of projects, from a very simple model, which can play only the game, to a high-grade model,
such as one can be used as DVD player or Internet. Yet she can choose only one project
because of the cost of development. The proﬁt from each project depends on the needs
of consumers worldwide. There are several regional subsidiaries. Each regional subsidiary
is informed about the needs of its own market but not about others. When the executive
collects information form the subsidiaries, there is the problem that she cannot elicit true
information because of the existence of an incentive conﬂict. Even when consumers prefers
the simple model, there is a possibility that the manager report untruthfully, because, for
example, their pay is increasing in not only the proﬁt of the entire ﬁrm, but also the sales
in their own market, and the high-grade model is easy to market so his expected proﬁt is
higher when he report untruthfully than when he report truthfully. When such an incentive
conﬂict exists, how should the executive design the communication procedure in order to
collect information from the subsidiaries?
To study the problem of strategic information transmission, I adopt a simple model, an
extension of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Speciﬁcally, I consider the two-agent1 situation.
Each agent observes diﬀerent and independent information. Each observation partially
informs about the realization of the state of nature. An agent sends a message about his
observation to the principal following a predetermined procedure. The principal then makes
a decision. The agents have an incentive to manipulate information because their objectives
1‘She’ refers to the principal and ‘he’ refers to the agents.
1
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-010
are diﬀerent from that of the principal. The diﬀerence in objectives between the principal
and the agents is systematic and predictable. This diﬀerence is called bias and is common
knowledge for all parties. Since the agents manipulate messages, the principal will not
rubberstamp the agents’ message but try to correct for the bias in objectives. When agents
anticipate this, the information transmission becomes strategic: each agent manipulates
information to achieve his self-interest by sending virtually the same message for diﬀerent
observations, the agents partition the support of the state of nature. By communication,
the principal cannot identify the true state of nature, but he can identify a partition in
which the true state of nature lies.
For most of the paper, two diﬀerent procedures, Horizontal Communication and Hierar-
chical Communication, are compared. In Horizontal Communication, all agents send their
messages directly and independently to the principal. In both Communication procedures,
the principal makes a decision. In Hierarchical Communication, an agent in a lower tier of
the hierarchy sends messages to the agent in an upper tier of the hierarchy, then the agent
in an upper tier of the hierarchy sends message to the principal. Each agent manipulates
messages anticipating not only the principal’s reaction but also another agent’s manipula-
tion. The diﬀerence between the two procedures arises from the diﬀerence in agent’s beliefs
about another agent’s and the principal’s behavior.
P
A B
P P
A A
B B
Horizontal Communication
Hierarchical Communication Delegation
Figure 1:
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In this paper, I assume that the principal cannot commit to her decision rule as a function
of any message from the agent. The lack of commitment would result from the diﬃculty with
contracting on action or messages. Non commitment implies ‘the ex-post optimality’: the
principal will take action that would be in her best interest ex-post. The agents anticipate
the ex-post optimality and send the message. The ex-post optimal behavior does not always
motivate the agents to send message truthfully. This contrasts with the Revelation Principle
setting in which the principal can commit to her decision rule. In the Revelation Principle,
the principal commits and chooses the decision rule which is optimal ex-ante, although it
is not optimal ex-post.
I show that Hierarchical Communication dominates Horizontal Communication. The
key to the analysis is that how the agent anticipates the principal’s ex-post optimal behavior.
When the agent believe that the principal reacts in a way that the agent prefers, the agent
does not need to curve his report to shift the principal’s behavior. Thus, the principal can
receive accurate information.
In Hierarchical Communication, the principal communicates with only one agent. The
agent, to achieve his self-interest, partitions the support of the state of nature. The dis-
advantage is that the principal cannot directly communicate with the agent in the lower
tier, so she can only receive aggregated messages about the state of nature and there is
distortion in the quality of information due to the communication between the agents. Yet
an advantage is that the intermediate agent internalizes all agents’ manipulation; the agent
gathers valuable information, so the principal reacts well to the agent’s message. The agent
can achieve his self-interest by modest level of information manipulation.
Horizontal Communication has the advantage in that the principal can receive separately
identiﬁed messages about the state of nature. However, this advantage is outweighed by the
disadvantage that the agents manipulate information more than in Hierarchical Communi-
cation. The information of one agent has only a fraction of importance for the principal
and the eﬀect of manipulation is proportional to its importance because of the principal’s
ex-post optimality. Then, in order to achieve his optimal objective, an agent needs to ma-
nipulate information largely. When an agent manipulates information, he anticipates the
3
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-010
eﬀect from another agent’s manipulation. However, an agent does not know about another
agent’s observation, he does not expect any eﬀect form another agent’ manipulation. There-
fore he tries to achieve his self-interest entirely through his own manipulation. The agents
tend to over-exaggerate.
Another topic related to information transmission concerns Delegation as an alternative
procedure to Communication. In Delegation, the principal neither communicates with the
agents nor makes the decision, but delegates her decision rights to one of the agents, so
the agent makes the decision after he communicates with the other agent. The advantage
of delegation is that there is no distortion of information by communication between the
principal and the agent. So the information is fully utilized. The disadvantage is that the
agent’s decision is biased. Dessein (2002) shows that Delegation dominates Communication
as long as bias is small. Although his model assumes that there is only one agent, I apply
his analysis in my model and shows Hierarchical Communication dominates Delegation for
large bias.2
There are three types in literatures studying the design of communication channel.
The ﬁrst approach assumes the commitment of the principal and applies the framework of
the Revelation Principle.3 Under a certain set of assumptions, this principle implies that
Horizontal Communication cannot be strictly dominated by Hierarchical Communication,
because the outcome of hierarchy can be replicated by commitment in Horizontal Communi-
cation. McAfee and McMillan (1995) provide an example where Hierarchy is never optimal,
due to a double marginalization of information rent, which arises from the monopoly power
of the intermediate agent over their information. This is often referred as ‘loss of control.’
In contrast, Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1995)
and Severinov (2003) provide conditions under which Hierarchy is an optimal procedure. In
their paper, when agents are providing complementary inputs and the principal can design
the sequence of contracting, Hierarchical structure is optimal. The second approach as-
2When the bias is large enough, Communication is uninformative but dominates Delegation.
3See Mookherjee (2003) for overview. This paper precludes the use of side payments by the nature of
the model. See Laﬀont and Martimort (1998) and Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998) for models of collusion and
organizational structure.
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sumes non-commitment of the principal. Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2002)
consider a situation in which the agents observe the same information. Wolinsky (2002)
studies a model with two agents who possess diﬀerent and independent information, which
is the closest to my scenario. However, the problem of designing an optimal communica-
tion channel is not studied. Bester and Strausz (2001) extend the revelation principle to
environments in which the principal cannot fully commit to the mechanism. However, their
result is restricted to the single agent situation. The example that a direct mechanism may
no longer be optimal with multi-agents is discussed in Bester and Strausz (2000). The third
approach is diﬀerent from the other two approaches. This approach assumes no incentive
conﬂicts between the principal and the agents, but that there exits information processing
costs. This approach has been pursued by Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994),
van Zandt (1997) and Garicano (2000) among others.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the
case in which the principal can commit to her action as a benchmark. Section 4 characterizes
the equilibrium for both Hierarchical and Horizontal Communication. Section 5 analyzes
the optimal procedure for communication when the agents are homogeneous. Section 6
discusses the case where the agents are heterogeneous. Section 7 compares Communication
and Delegation and Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
My model has one principal, P , and two agents, A and B. The principal has the opportunity
to select a project. There are inﬁnitely many potential projects, but only one project can
be undertaken. Each project can be represented by a real number y 2 R. The value of
a project depends on the state of nature, µ, which P cannot observe. A observes a signal
® and B observes a signal ¯. ® and ¯ represent some partial amount of information of µ,
say µ = µ(®; ¯). µ : [0; 1]2 ! [0; 1] is increasing and continuous in both ® and ¯. I assume
that ® (¯) has a distribution function F (®) (G(¯)), diﬀerentiable almost everywhere, with
support [0; 1]. ® is A’s private information and B cannot observe this and vice versa.
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Preferences. P has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
UP (y; µ) = ¡(y ¡ µ)2:
P has an unique utility maximizer at y = µ.
The agent l’s (l = A;B) preference is represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function
Ul(y; µ; cl) = ¡(y ¡ (µ + cl))2; cl > 0:
where cl is a parameter of dissonance between P and l, in other words cl may be thought of
as the bias of the agent.4 The utility function of agent l is maximized for y = µ+ cl. There
are no monetary transfers between P and the agents.
cA and cB are assumed to be greater than zero in order to capture the idea that agents
have similar biases because they are in a similar environment.5 Recall the example of
the video game machine maker, where both regional subsidiaries prefer the high-grade
model. The utility functions and distribution functions of the random variables are common
knowledge.
The timing of the decision making process is as follows:
1. The principal chooses a decision/communication procedure from Hierarchical Com-
munication, Horizontal Communication and Delegation.
2. The agents learn ® and ¯ and send a message to the higher rank following the proce-
dure chosen by the principal.
3. The player who holds decision rights chooses the project.
The equilibrium concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
4It is worth noting that biases are often endogenous. They arise as a result of incentive schemes under
imperfect and incomplete information. The wage of the regional subsidiary, for example, is contingent on
the sales on his own market and not on the proﬁt of entire ﬁrm, because his eﬀort level is unobservable.
However, in order to simplify the analysis, I assume that the bias is exogenous.
5The results of this analysis also hold when cl < 0.
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3 Benchmark: the Principal can commit to a decision rule
In this section, I consider the benchmark case that the principal can commit to a decision
rule.
Proposition 1. When the principal can commit to a decision rule, Horizontal Communi-
cation dominates Hierarchical Communication and Delegation.
Proof. All the proofs are in the appendix.
The implication is that, under Horizontal Communication, the principal can implement
the outcome of Hierarchical Communication and Delegation. In general, Hierarchical Com-
munication and Delegation are strictly dominated by Horizontal Communication, because
the principal loses control over the agent.
4 Equilibrium
In this section, the equilibrium of both Horizontal and Hierarchical Communication is char-
acterized. When no commitment, P always undertakes the project which maximizes her
expected utility conditional on her beliefs about the state of nature. Hence, agents achieve
manipulation by changing the beliefs of the principal. Crawford and Sobel (1982) ﬁrst stud-
ied this problem. They show that, in a single agent and single information model, the agent
sends virtually the same message for diﬀerent observations, so partitions the support of the
state of nature in the equilibrium. I follow their work and investigate how each procedure
aﬀects the beliefs and incentives for manipulation.
4.1 Hierarchical Communication
Assume cA = cB = c for simplicity.6 Under this assumption, the agents communicate
truthfully. Hence the model is equivalent to the single agent model. Consider that A
observes private information µ whose distribution function is H(µ) and that the equilibrium
is characterized by a message rule ¹(kjµ) for the agent, where for every µ 2 [0; 1], ¹(kjµ) is
6Heterogeneous case will be discussed later in this paper.
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the conditional probability of sending message k given state µ, and a decision rule y(k) for
P .
Crawford and Sobel show that each Bayesian equilibrium has the following structure.
The state space is partitioned into K intervals T ´ (t0 = 0; t1; : : : ; tK¡1; tK = 1). Deﬁne
ex-post optimality of P ,
y(ti¡1; ti) ´
8><>:argmax
R ti
ti¡1 UP (y; µ)dH(µ) if ti¡1 < ti;
ti if ti¡1 = ti:
Proposition 2. (Crawford and Sobel: Theorem 1) If c 6= 0, then a positive integer K(c)
exists such that, for every K with 1 · K · K(c), at least one equilibrium (y(k); ¹(kjµ))
exists,
¹(kjµ) = 1 if µ 2 (ti¡1; ti) for some k 2 (ti¡1; ti);
UA(y(ti; ti+1); ti) = UA(y(ti¡1; ti); ti) (i = 1; : : : ; N ¡ 1); (1)
y(k) = y(ti¡1; ti) if k 2 (ti¡1; ti):
Figure 2 demonstrates the idea of information partition. The information partitions are
given by contour lines. A partition equilibrium is due to A’s eﬀort to shift P ’s choice of the
project by c. Since P chooses project ex-post optimally, A can achieve his manipulation
by sending virtually the same message for diﬀerent observations and changing the beliefs of
the principal so changing y(ti¡1; ti).
In general, there are multiple equilibria. In this paper, I often refer to the equilibrium
with the largest partition elements.7 The level of manipulation is increasing in bias, c. When
bias is suﬃciently large, the unique equilibrium has single information partition element,
thus the communication is ‘uninformative’. The smaller bias is, the more ‘informative’
communication becomes. Spector (2000) shows that, in the limit, the largest number of
partition elements goes to inﬁnity, so communication is perfect for any distribution.
7Kartik (2005) considers the “almost” cheap talk game in which there is the cost of misreporting. His
equilibrium converges to the equilibrium with the largest partition elements in CS when this cost goes to
zero. The equilibrium with the largest partition elements can satisﬁes his “No Incentive to Separate (NITS)”
condition.
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µ
®
¯
Figure 2: Information Partition in Hierarchical Communication.
4.2 Horizontal Communication
When considering the case of Horizontal Communication, the assumption that cl > 0 is
reapplied.8 A message rule for A is denoted by ¹A(nj®), where for every ® 2 [0; 1], ¹A(nj®)
is the conditional probability of sending message n given state ®. For B, the corresponding
conditional probability is ¹B(mj¯). The principal’s decision rule is given by y¯(n;m).
The Bayesian equilibrium of this model is also a partition equilibrium. Let A ´ (a0 =
0; : : : ; aN = 1) and B ´ (b0 = 0; : : : ; bM = 1). Deﬁne the ex-post optimality of P such that,
y¯((ai¡1; ai); (bj¡1; bj))
´
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
argmax
R ai
ai¡1
R bj
bj¡1 UP (y; µ(®; ¯))dG(¯)dF (®) if ai¡1 < ai and bj¡1 < bj ;
argmax
R bj
bj¡1 UP (y; µ(ai; ¯))dG(¯) if ai¡1 = ai and bj¡1 < bj ;
argmax
R ai
ai¡1 UP (y; µ(®; bj))dF (®) if ai¡1 < ai and bj¡1 = bj ;
µ(ai; bi) if ai¡1 = ai and bj¡1 = bj :
8Assuming cA = cB = c may simplify the problem and does not lose the implication.
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The proposition 3 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (The equilibrium of Horizontal Communication Model) If cl 6= 0, then
there exists an equilibrium (y¯(n;m); ¹A(nj®)); ¹B(mj¯) with some positive integers (N;M)
where,
¹A(nj®) = 1 if ® 2 (ai¡1; ai) for some n 2 (ai¡1; ai);
¹B(mj¯) = 1 if ¯ 2 (bj¡1; bj) for some m 2 (bj¡1; bj);
¡PMj fG(bj)¡G(bj¡1)g R bjbj¡1 UAfy¯((ai¡1; ai); (bj¡1; bj)); µ(ai; ¯)gdG(¯)
= ¡PMj fG(bj)¡G(bj¡1)g R bjbj¡1 UAfy¯((ai; ai+1); (bj¡1; bj)); µ(ai; ¯)gdG(¯) (i = 1; : : : N ¡ 1);(2)
¡PNi fF (ai)¡ F (ai¡1)g R aiai¡1 UBfy¯((ai¡1; ai); (bj¡1; bj)); µ(®; bj)gdF (®)
= ¡PNi fF (ai)¡ F (ai¡1)g R aiai¡1 UBfy¯((ai; ai+1); (bj¡1; bj)); µ(®; bj)gdF (®) (j = 1; : : :M ¡ 1);(3)
y¯(n;m) = y¯((ai¡1; ai); (bj¡1; bj)) if n 2 (ai¡1; ai); m 2 (bj¡1; bj):
At least one equilibrium with N =M = 1 exist.
µ
®
ai ai+1
¯
Figure 3: Information Partition in Horizontal Communication.
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Figure 3 illustrates a typical of the equilibrium information partitions. (2) is the in-
centive compatible condition of A and (3) is that of B. In Horizontal Communication,
since each agent’s incentive compatible condition depends on another agent’s behavior, the
number of partition elements of each agent generally depends on that of the other agent.
Consider µ = ±A®+ ±B¯ (0 < ±A + ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l = A;B)).9 In this case, ±l can be
interpreted as the importance of agent l’s information. When the state of nature is a linear
function of the agents’ information, the inter-dependence between the agents vanishes, and
also this case helps clarify our understanding. Here are two key observations. First, an
agent’s manipulation has a fraction of eﬀect on P ’s choice. Since the utility functions of
the principal is quadratic, P chooses the project as follows,
y¯((ai¡1; ai); (bj¡1; bj)) = ±A®¯(ai¡1; ai) + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj); (4)
where ®¯(ai¡1; ai) ´ E(®j(ai¡1; ai)), ¯¯(bj¡1; bj) ´ E(¯j(bj¡1; bj)). (4) shows that A’s manip-
ulation has an eﬀect through ±A®¯(ai¡1; ai): A’s information manipulation can change P ’s
belief about A’s information, then P reacts proportionally to the importance of information
A possessing.
Second, the incentive compatible condition of A is independent from B’s behavior.
Lemma 1. If µ = ±A® + ±B¯ (0 < ±A + ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l = A;B)), given the ex-post
optimality of P , each agent’s incentive compatible condition is independent from the other
agent’s choice of information partition.
Corollary 1. If µ = ±A®+ ±B¯ (0 < ±A+ ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l = A;B)), positive integers,
N(cA) and M(cB), exist such that for every 1 · N · N(cA) and 1 · M · M(cB), an
equilibrium described in Proposition 3 exists.
The Lemma 1 shows that when the state of nature is a linear function of the agents’
information and the principal chooses the project ex-post optimally, an agent’s incentive
compatible condition is independent from another agent’s choice of information partitions:
number of partition elements of each agent does not depend on that of the other agent.
9The results hold for a linear function such that µ = ±A® + ±B¯ + ° (0 < ±A + ±B + ° · 1; 0 < ±l <
1 (l = A;B); 0 < ° < 1). Without loss of generality, I proceed my analysis with a linear function above.
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The intuition is as follows. P learns the information partition in which the true state
of nature lies and chooses the project ex-post optimally for every information partition.
Meanwhile A does not know about B’s information, it is as if P elicited true information
and B did not successfully manipulate any information. Now, in order to archive his self-
interest, he tries to shift the choice of P all through his manipulation. The same is true for
B, thus both agents try to shift P ’s choice by c.
In summary, both agents manipulate information by c±l in order to shift c, because one
unit of manipulation has ±l of eﬀect. In fact, (2) can be written as
®¯(ai¡1; ai) + ®¯(ai; ai+1) = 2
µ
ai +
cA
±A
¶
: (5)
This equation shows that A behaves as if his bias was cA±A .
Next, I provide an example for when random variables have a uniform distribution.
Example 1. Suppose cA = cB = c, µ = ±A® + ±B¯, (0 < ±A + ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l =
A;B)) and ®; ¯ » U(0; 1). Then compute
y¯((ai; ai+1); (bj ; bj+1)) = ±A
ai + ai+1
2
+ ±B
bj + bj+1
2
;
i = 0; : : : ; N ¡ 1; j = 0; : : : ;M ¡ 1:
The incentive compatible condition (2) is
¡
MX
j
fG(bj)¡G(bj¡1)g
Z bj
bj¡1
µ
±A
ai + ai+1
2
+ ±B
bj¡1 + bj
2
¡ (±A®+ ±B¯ + c)
¶2
d¯
= ¡
MX
j
fG(bj)¡G(bj¡1)g
Z bj
bj¡1
µ
±A
ai¡1 + ai
2
+ ±B
bj¡1 + bj
2
¡ (±A®+ ±B¯ + c)
¶2
d¯;
i = 0; : : : ; N ¡ 1;
which implies that
ai = a1i+ 2i(i¡ 1) c
±A
; i = 0; : : : ; N:
Similarly
bj = b1j + 2j(j ¡ 1) c
±B
; j = 0; : : : ;M:
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These equations reveal a key point of the model. A (B) behaves like an agent with bias c±A
( c±B ) in the Crawford and Sobel model.
The largest numbers of partition elements are
N(c) =
*
¡1
2
+
1
2
µ
1 +
2±A
c
¶ 1
2
+
; M(c) =
*
¡1
2
+
1
2
µ
1 +
2±B
c
¶ 1
2
+
;
where hzi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to z. If c±A > 14 then N(c) = 1
and P cannot get any information from A. If c±B >
1
4 then M(c) = 1 and P cannot get any
information from B. In sum, if 14 maxf±A; ±Bg < c, P is uninformed about both agents. On
the other hand, in Hierarchical Communication case, Crawford and Sobel Corollary 1 shows
that an informative equilibrium exists if c < 14 . So, if
1
4 maxf±A; ±Bg < c < 14 , Hierarchical
Communication dominates Horizontal. The next section generalizes this result and develops
the intuition.
Notice that the sequential consulting rule is also analyzed in this framework. Suppose
B and A sequentially report to P , and A can observe B’s message as Krishna and Morgan
(2001). When µ = ±A® + ±B¯ (0 < ±A + ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l = A;B)), A learns some
information about ¯, which is equivalent to updating a subjective distribution of ¯. In
this analysis, the change of distribution G(¯) has no eﬀect on A’s incentive compatible
condition, then no eﬀect on A’s behavior given best responses of P and B as before. Given
this, B faces exactly the same situation as Horizontal Communication. In summary, the
equilibrium under the sequential rule is also characterized by Proposition 3.
5 Optimal Communication Procedure
Large Bias
For suﬃciently large bias, no informative communication occurs, and P ’s utility is equivalent
in both procedures. Thus in this section, I focus on the level of bias c = cA = cB that
causes communication to be informative in only one procedure. In the previous section, an
example was given where Hierarchical Communication dominates Horizontal when random
variables are uniformly distributed. Now this result and intuition are generalized to other
13
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-010
distributions. From here on, assume that µ = ±A®+ ±B¯ (0 < ±A+ ±B · 1; 0 < ±l < 1 (l =
A;B)).
Hierarchical Communication.
Lemma 2. If 12E(±A®+ ±B¯) < c, the unique equilibrium is uninformative.
Suppose an informative equilibrium exists. Proposition 2 says that in such a case an
equilibrium with two partition elements also exists. To show that the unique the equilibrium
of Hierarchical Communication is uninformative, it is suﬃcient to show that an equilibrium
with two partition elements does not exist. The above lemma gives the condition.
Horizontal Communication.
Lemma 3. If 12±AE(®) < c, the communication with agent A is uninformative.
From Corollary 1, since the number of information partitions of each agent is inde-
pendent, attention may be restricted to only one agent. I exploit the fact, again, that an
equilibrium with two partition elements does not exist when communication with an agent
is uninformative.
Since E(±B¯) > 0, a case may occur where it is impossible for the principal to com-
municate informatively with an agent in Horizontal Communication, while it is possible for
her to do so with an agent in Hierarchical Communication. These results are summarized
in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4. If 12 maxf±AE(®); ±BE(¯)g < c < 12E(±A® + ±B¯), Hierarchical Commu-
nication dominates Horizontal Communication.
Corollary 2. There exists some c¯ 2 [0; 12 maxf±AE(®); ±BE(¯)g), such that for all c 2
(c¯; 12E(±A®+ ±B¯)) Hierarchical Communication dominates Horizontal Communication.
Since P ’s equilibrium utility is continuous in c and converges to zero as c goes to zero,
some threshold value c¯ exists such that, for all c > c¯, Hierarchical Communication is superior
as long as it is informative.
14
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Comparative Statics
The above result is due to the principal’s non-commitment power. In Horizontal Com-
munication, as seen in the previous section, an agent expects no eﬀect of another agent’s
manipulation on his incentive compatible condition, because P chooses project ex-post
optimal. Then both agents exercise high levels of manipulation because P reacts propor-
tionally to the importance of their information. This implies that the level of information
manipulation decreases when P reacts more than before.
Corollary 3. When the importance of information, ±l, increases, agent l’s incentive to
manipulate his information declines.
This result is obtained from incentive compatible condition (5). Agent l manipulates
information by c±l . This level of manipulation is decreasing in ±l, because P reacts pro-
portionally to ±l and l can achieve his self-interest at low level of manipulation when ±l is
large.
Corollary 4. When bias is large, the probability that Hierarchical Communication domi-
nates Horizontal Communication increases in the importance of information, ±l.
From Proposition 4, since 12 maxf±AE(®); ±BE(¯)g is weakly increasing in ±A and ±B,
and 12E(±A® + ±B¯) is strictly increasing, the interval of bias where Hierarchical Commu-
nication is superior increases in the importance of information.
Small Bias
When bias is large, whether communication is informative or not depends on relative size of
bias and support of state of nature, and it is independent from their distribution. For small
c, the principal’s expected utility is determined also by distribution functions. It is diﬃcult
to compare analytically between Horizontal and Hierarchical Communication. Here, P ’s
utility level is calculated numerically. Figure 0a shows utility of the principal against the
level of agents’ bias, when µ = 12® +
1
2¯, ®; ¯ » U [0; 1] and Figure 0b shows when the
15
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distribution of ® and ¯ are triangle distribution.10 Solid, dots and dashes, and short dashes
lines stand for Hierarchical Communication, Horizontal Communication and Delegation (I
will discuss about this procedure below. ), respectively.
[Figure 0 (attached in the last page). ]
The results suggest that, in Horizontal Communication, the cost of ‘double marginal-
ization’ overweigh the advantage of receiving separately identiﬁed message about the state
of nature, even for small bias in these cases. Hierarchical Communication is better than
Horizontal.
Remarks
In Hierarchical Communication, there is only one agent who communicates with P and
he internalizes all the agents’ manipulations. Then P only faces the problem in which an
agent, who gathers information, tries to shift P ’s choice as much as c, but his manipulation
is modest because he possesses valuable information. So even if there is some distortion in
the quality of information when the lower agent communicates with the intermediate agent,
as long as this level of distortion is low, Hierarchical Communication is desirable. This is
discussed in more detail in the next section.
A few comments are in order regarding an extension of the model with three or more
agents. When the number of the agents increases, the importance of the information that
each agent possesses decreases. So each agent exerts high level of information manipulation
when directly communicating between the principal. In Hierarchical Communication, it
may increase distortion of information quality by adding additional layer of communication
between agents. This information distortion completely vanishes when the agents have the
same bias; it is always optimal for the principal that one agent collects information from
all other agents and then communicates with her. This result is in contrast with Wolinsky
(2002), that the extent of information revealed does not necessarily increased with the size of
10f(®) = 4® if 0 · ® < 1
2
and = 4(1 ¡ ®) if 1
2
· ® · 1. g(¯) = 4¯ if 0 · ¯ < 1
2
and = 4(1 ¡ ¯) if
1
2
· ¯ · 1.
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information which the agent collects. When the agents’ preferences are heterogeneous, some
combination of Hierarchical Communication with Horizontal Communication, also with
Delegation another procedure discussed below, may be the optimal. Because of technical
diﬃculty, however, I do not explore further about this point in this paper.
6 Heterogeneous Agents
The preference of each agent is usually diﬀerent from the other. However, it is not hard
to imagine individuals whose backgrounds are similar so that they share some similarity
in their preference. Thus this section considers the case when the bias of the agents are
heterogeneous, cB > cA > 0.
The equilibrium of Horizontal Communication is characterized in Proposition 3. Each
agent behaves as if his bias is cA±A (
cB
±B
). In Hierarchical Communication, two procedures are
considered, Hierarchy P-A-B and P-B-A. In Hierarchy P-A-B, agent A is the intermediate
agent and in P-B-A B is the intermediate. First, consider Hierarchy P-A-B. Applying Craw-
ford and Sobel Theorem 1, the equilibrium is again to partition the set of the state of nature.
Suppose there is information transmission between agent A and B, B ´ (b0 = 0; bi; bM = 1).
Then the incentive compatible condition of agent A sending diﬀerent messages n and n0 after
he receives message from agent B is,
¡E¯
h
fy(n)¡ (±A®+ ±B¯ + cA)g2 jbi¡1 · ¯ · bi
i
= ¡E¯
h©
y(n0)¡ (±A®+ ±B¯ + cA)
ª2 jbi¡1 · ¯ · bii
, y(n) + y(n0) = 2 [±A®+ ±BE(¯jbi¡1 · ¯ · bi) + cA] ;
which implies that the message game between the principal and agent A is as if agent A’s
private information was his subjective belief about µ, µ˜ ´ ±A® + ±BE(¯jbi¡1 · ¯ · bi),
the probability density of ® is f(®) and E(¯jbi¡1 · ¯ · bi) distributes discretely with
probability G(bi)¡G(bi¡1).
Let T˜ ´ (t˜0; t˜1; : : : ; t˜K¡1; t˜K) be a partition on µ˜ with K elements. Then P who received
message (t˜i; t˜i+1) chooses project y which is ex-post optimal. Now the problem may be
17
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b1
4
1+b1
4
1
2 +
b1
4
1
2 +
1+b1
4 µ˜
2
2(1¡ b1)
2b1
Figure 4: pdf of µ˜
simpliﬁed as follows.
y(t˜i; t˜i+1) + y(t˜i¡1; t˜i) = 2t˜i + 2cA: (6)
(6) shows that the agent’s information manipulation has an eﬀect through y(t˜i; t˜i+1). The
level of information manipulation depends on how P evaluates information which A pos-
sesses; the importance of information µ˜.
Proposition 5. In Hierarchy P-A-B, informative equilibrium does not exist if 12E(±A® +
±B¯) < cA.
Similar condition can be obtained for Hierarchy P-B-A. An interesting question is which
Hierarchy transmits more information.
Corollary 5. Suppose cA < cB. If cA < 12E(±A® + ±B¯) < cB, Hierarchy P-A-B (weakly)
dominates Hierarchy P-B-A.
When cB is suﬃciently large, communication is not informative in Hierarchy P-B-A,
while it may be informative in Hierarchy P-A-B. A comment regarding general compar-
ison. Length of information partition B is generally increasing in Hierarchy P-A-B, but
decreasing in Hierarchy P-B-A. The latter may induce more information transmission when
A is communicating with P . There is a possibility that Hierarchy P-B-A is desirable. Also,
because there often exists multiple equilibria, it is hard to say which equilibrium is the most
18
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-010
desirable. This problem generally makes comparison between Hierarchical and Horizontal
Communication diﬃcult.
Corollary 6. If (12±AE(®);
1
2±BE(¯)) ¿ (cA; cB) and minfcA; cBg < 12E(±A® + ±B¯),
Hierarchical Communication (weakly) dominates Horizontal Communication.
Example 2. Consider ±A±B = 12 , ®; ¯ » U(0; 1), cA = 18 and cB = 15 . Then there
is no information transmission in Horizontal Communication. On the other hand, under
Hierarchical Communication, an informative equilibrium exists.11 Thus communication
between the principal and agents is informative.
In Hierarchical Communication, even in heterogeneous agents case, P still faces the
problem in which only A manipulates information to shift P ’s choice by cA. The only dif-
ference from identical agents case is that distortion of information quality in communication
between agents increases the level of information manipulation by A. When there is distor-
tion, the information of A become less important. P always behaves ex-post optimally, so
one unit of manipulation induces less than one unit of eﬀect when the information is less
important. To achieve his self-interest, A increasingly manipulates information. In the ex-
treme, when no information transmission occurs between A and B, A behaves as if cA±A . The
example shows the case when distortion in the quality of information is smaller than the
cost of double marginalization of information manipulation in Horizontal Communication.
7 Delegation
In this section, I consider Delegation of authority. When an agent is delegated a decision
rights from the principal, he chooses a project which maximizes his utility. This type of
procedure in the cheap talk model was studied by Dessein (2002). Throughout this section,
I assume cA = cB = c. The advantage of delegation is that there is no distortion of
information by communication. The disadvantage is that the agent’s decision is biased.
Desirability of Delegation depends on the trade oﬀ between above two eﬀects.
11See Appendix.
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Example 3. Suppose µ = 12®+
1
2¯ and ®; ¯ » U(0; 1). When authority is delegated to
agent A, he will choose y = µ+ c, then the utility of the principal is ¡c2. In both Commu-
nication procedures, P ’s expected utility is at least ¡ 124 = ¡V ar(µ), when communication
is uninformative. Then if c >
p
6
12 , Communication procedure dominate Delegation. In this
example, the expected utility of the principal under Horizontal Communication is
EUHoP = ¡
NX
i=1
MX
j=1
Z bj
bj¡1
Z ai
ai¡1
µ
ai + ai¡1
4
+
bj + bj¡i
4
¡ (®
2
+
¯
2
)
¶2
d®d¯
= ¡ 1
48
8<:
NX
i=1
(ai ¡ ai¡1)3 +
MX
j=1
(bj ¡ bj¡1)3
9=;
= ¡ 1
48
½
1
N2
+ 16c2(N2 ¡ 1)
¾
+
1
48
½
1
M2
+ 16c2(M2 ¡ 1)
¾
:
One can verify that for N;M ¸ 2, EUHoP < ¡c2, thus Delegation dominates Horizontal
Communication whenever informative communication is possible. Horizontal Communica-
tion is also dominated by Hierarchical when informative communication is not possible in
Horizontal. This example shows thee case that Horizontal Communication is dominated by
other procedures for all level of bias. See Figure 0a for the results.
In general, in Communication procedures, P ’s utility has the lower bound, while it kept
decreasing with bias in Delegation. The worst P ’s utility level is archived when communica-
tion is uninformative, and is the negative of variance of the state of nature. Communication
is more desirable when F (®) and G(¯) have low variance. Figure 0b shows the result when
the distributions of ® and ¯ are triangle distribution, thus the variance is smaller than that
of Example 3. Communication dominates Delegation even for smaller bias.
Proposition 6. Both Communication procedures dominate Delegation whenq
±2AV ar(®) + ±
2
BV ar(¯) < c:
Corollary 7. There exist some c˜ > 0, such that for all c > c˜, one form of Communication
procedure dominates Delegation.
±2AV ar(®) + ±
2
BV ar(¯) is increasing in ±l. The implication is that, when the impor-
tance of agent’s information, ±l, increases, the relative gain in information utilization by
20
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Delegation increases. Though, as seen in Corollary 3, the agent’s information manipulation
becomes moderate and communication becomes more informative when ±l increases, for suf-
ﬁcient large bias such that satisfying Proposition 6, since communication is uninformative
at all, there is no gain form less manipulation: when the importance of agents’ information
increases, P ’s willingness to delegate increases. This result is consistent with Harris and
Raviv (2005).12
When bias converges to zero and P ’s utility converges to zero, Dessein shows that, the
order of convergence is higher in Delegation than in Communication. This result implies
that Delegation dominates Communication for a suﬃciently small bias. Figure 5 summarize
the result when the variances of the random variables are small enough.
Uninformative
(Communication)Hierarchical
Delegation
0 ¡!Bias
Figure 5:
8 Conclusion
This paper discussed the issue of decision/communication procedures in a situation where
the principal elicits information from multiple agents when an incentive conﬂict exists.
When the principal can commit to her action, the benchmark case, Horizontal Communi-
cation is superior to other procedures. Horizontal Communication is superior because the
principal can always design an incentive scheme that induces better information transmis-
sion.
In a no commitment environment, this result no longer holds. The principal’s ex-post
optimal behavior induces more manipulation in Horizontal Communication. First, because
ex-post optimality neutralizes manipulation of another agent in the expected terms, both
12Their model has one agent and one principal, each player observes the independent private information.
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agents manipulate more information to shift the principal’s choice as much as their bias.
Second, because the principal reacts only proportional to the importance of the agent’s
information, the level of manipulation is an inverse of the importance. Since Hierarchical
Communication internalizes all agents’ manipulation, communication becomes more infor-
mative. Finally, Delegation is desirable when bias is small and the variance of the state of
nature is high.
These results have potentially important implications for the design of organization.
This paper suggest that commitment power can be a factor that determines the shape of
the optimal organization structure.13
A Proofs
Proof. (of Proposition 1) Show that the solution for Hierarchical Communication is imple-
mentable in Horizontal Communication, when the principal can to commit her action.
The problem is a choice of P ’s decision rule as a function of receiving message(s) from
her agents, y(¢). A message rule for agent l is denoted by ¹l(nj¢), the conditional probability
of sending message n given the information about the state of nature.
Horizontal Communication. Let nho(®) be the message sent by agent A who observes
®, nHo(®) 2 fnj¹A(nj®) > 0g, and mho(¯) respectively for B. Then the principal chooses
a decision rule, yho(¢; ¢), a function of two messages, which solves the following problem,
max
yho(¢;¢)
EUP (y; ®; ¯)
s:t: nho(®) 2 argmaxE¯UA(y; ®; ¯);
mho(¯) 2 argmaxE®UB(y; ®; ¯):
Hierarchical Communication. In this case, A’s message rule is a function of his obser-
vation and the message received from B, thus the message sent by A who observes ® and
receives message m is nhi(®;m). B’s rule is a function of his observation, mhi, and P ’s
decision rule is a function of the single message, yhi(¢). Consider two cases: when A cannot
13Brusco and Panunzi (2005) and Mailath, Nocke, and Postlewaite (2002) discuss the subject of organi-
zational design in light of commitment.
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commit to nhi(®;m) and when he can. When A cannot commit to message rule, then the
principal solves the following problem,
max
yhi(¢)
EUP (y; ®; ¯)
s:t: nhi(®;mhi) 2 argmaxE¯ [UA(y; ®; ¯)j¹¡1B (¯jmhi)];
mhi(¯) 2 argmaxE®UB(y; ®; ¯):
¹¡1B (¯jm) is the probability measure of B’s type given message m. When A can commit to
his message rule, the constraints are,
s:t: nhi(®;mhi) 2 argmaxE¯UA(y; ®; ¯);
mhi(¯) 2 argmaxE®UB(y; ®; ¯):
Delegation. In this case, A chooses the project. When A cannot commit to his choice
of project, this problem is written as,
EUP (yd; ®; ¯)
s:t: yd(®;md) 2 argmaxE¯[UA(y; ®; ¯)j¹¡1B (¯jmd)];
md(¯) 2 argmaxE®UB(y; ®; ¯):
The constraint when A can commit to his choice of project can be written as,
s:t: yd(®;md) 2 argmaxE¯UA(y; ®; ¯);
md(¯) 2 argmaxE®UB(y; ®; ¯):
First consider when A cannot commit to his message rule. Let the solution for Hierar-
chical Communication be y¤hi(¢) and n¤hi(¢; ¢) and m¤hi(¢) be the equilibrium strategy. y¤hi and
n¤hi andm
¤
hi is an equilibrium, which satisﬁes the following incentive compatible constraints,
E¯ [UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯gj¹¡1B (¯jm)]
¸ E¯ [UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®0;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯gj¹¡1B (¯jm)] 8®0;m:
(7)
E®UBfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯g
¸ E®UBfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯0))); ®; ¯g 8¯0:
(8)
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Now consider the case of Horizontal Communication. Due to the revelation princi-
ple, attention is restricted to a direct mechanism. Suppose P commits to yho(®; ¯) =
y¤hi(n
¤
hi(®;m
¤
hi(¯))). From (8) above, it can be seen that B is incentive compatible. Fur-
thermore, A is incentive compatible because,
E¯UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯g
=
Z
E¯ [UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯gj¹¡1B (¯jm)]¹B(mj¯)dG(¯)
and (7) implies ® maximizes his expected utility. The solution for Hierarchical Communi-
cation is implementable in Horizontal Communication.
When A can commit to his message rule, the incentive compatible constraint in Hori-
zontal Communication (7) is replaced by,
E¯UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯g
¸ E¯UAfy¤hi(n¤hi(®0;m¤hi(¯))); ®; ¯g 8®0:
It can be seen that A is incentive compatible in Horizontal Communication when P commits
to yho(®; ¯) = y¤hi(n
¤
hi(®;m
¤
hi(¯))).
Also, the project under Delegation, y¤d(®;m
¤
d(¯)), is implementable by commitment.
Proof. (of Proposition 3) First show that the set of actions induced in the equilibrium is
ﬁnite. Thus deﬁne, for all ®; ¯ 2 [0; 1],
yP (®; ¯) ´ argmaxUP (y; µ(®; ¯));
yl(®; ¯; cl) ´ argmaxUl(y; µ(®; ¯); cl); (l = A;B):
Lemma 4. If yP (®; ¯) 6= yl(®; ¯; cl) (l = A;B) for all ®; ¯, then an ² > 0 exists such
that if v(®; ¯) is action induced in equilibrium when the state of nature is ® and ¯, then
jv(®0; ¯)¡v(®00; ¯)j ¸ ² for all ¯ if v(®0; ¯) 6= v(®00; ¯) for ®0 6= ®00 and jv(®; ¯0)¡v(®; ¯00)j ¸
² for all ® if v(®; ¯0) 6= v(®; ¯00) for ¯0 6= ¯00.
Proof. For convenience, let w(¯) = v(®0; ¯) and u(¯) = v(®00; ¯) such that w(¯0) < u(¯0)
for some ¯0. Then there exists ®ˆ 2 [0; 1] such that
E¯UA(w(¯); ®ˆ; cA) = E¯UA(u(¯); ®ˆ; cA):
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Since UA11 < 0 and UA12 > 0,
w(¯0) < yA(®ˆ; ¯0) < v(¯0); (9)
fw(¯)g¯2[0;1] are not induced by agent A observes ® > ®ˆ (10)
and
fv(¯)g¯2[0;1] are not induced by agent A observes ® < ®ˆ: (11)
(10) and (11) and UP12 > 0 imply
w(¯) · yP (®ˆ; ¯) · u(¯) 8¯: (12)
If yP (®; ¯) 6= yA(®; ¯; cA); 8®; ¯ 2 [0; 1], there is an ² such that jyP (®; ¯)¡ yA(®; ¯; cA)j ¸
µ; 8®; ¯ 2 [0; 1]. It follows from (9) and (12) that u(¯) ¡ w(¯) ¸ ², which is jv(®0; ¯) ¡
v(®00; ¯)j ¸ ² for all ¯ if v(®0; ¯) 6= v(®00; ¯) for ®0 6= ®00. Using the same argument,
jv(®; ¯0)¡ v(®; ¯00)j ¸ ² for all ® if v(®; ¯0) 6= v(®; ¯00) for ¯0 6= ¯00.
Lemma 4 implies that the set of actions induced in equilibrium is ﬁnite since they are
bounded by yP (0; 0) and yP (1; 1). Also, Lemma 4 establishes that equilibrium is a partition
equilibrium.
Given the partition of agent B’s (A’s) message rule, B (A), P and A (B) solve one
variation of the Crawford and Sobel model. The equilibrium partition A is not always
independent from B and vice versa.
Proof. (of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1) When the state of nature is linear, the incentive
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compatible condition of A (2) is
MX
j=1
(G(bj)¡G(bj¡1))£f±A®¯(ai¡1; ai) + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj)g2 ¡ f±A®¯(ai; ai+1) + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj)g2¤
= 2
MX
j=1
(G(bj)¡G(bj¡1))£f±A®¯(ai¡1; ai) + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj)g ¡ f±A®¯(ai; ai+1) + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj)g¤
f(±Aai + ±B ¯¯(bj¡1; bj) + cg;
,
MX
j=1
(G(bj)¡G(bj¡1))[±2Af®¯(ai¡1; ai)2 ¡ ®¯(ai; ai+1)2g]
= 2
MX
j=1
(G(bj)¡G(bj¡1)) [±Af®¯(ai¡1; ai)¡ ®¯(ai; ai+1)g(±Aai + cA)] ;
, ®¯(ai¡1; ai) + ®¯(ai; ai+1) = 2
µ
ai +
cA
±A
¶
: (13)
Since the above equation is independent from B, which implies the communication game
between A and P is done as in the single agent situation. From Crawford and Sobel Theorem
1, there exists a partition equilibrium of every size from one to N(cA). Applying the same
argument for B, there exists a partition equilibrium of every size from one to M(cB).
Proof. (of Lemma 2) From Proposition 2, whenever an informative equilibrium exists, an
equilibrium with two partition elements (K = 2) also exists. Then it is enough to show the
conditions under which such an equilibrium does not exist.
A partition equilibrium with two partition elements exists iﬀ 9µ 2 (0; 1) s.t.
µ + c¡ y(0; µ) = y(µ; 1)¡ (µ + c): (14)
equivalently
2c = y(0; µ) + y(µ; 1)¡ 2µ: (15)
Since y(¢) is continuous function and @y(0;µ)@µ < 1 and @y(µ;1)@µ < 1 where they are diﬀerentiable,
RHS of this equality is decreasing function of µ. Then a µ which satisﬁes the above condition
does not exist iﬀ 2c > y(0; 1) = E(µ) = E(±A®+ ±B¯) there does not exist.
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Proof. (of Lemma 3) Similar to Lemma2, whenever A is informative, there exist an infor-
mation partition with two elements (N = 2). Thus it is enough to show the conditions
under which such information partition does not exist.
An information partition with two element exist iﬀ 9a 2 (0; 1) s.t.
2c = ±A®¯(0; a) + ±A®¯(a; 1)¡ 2±Aa: (16)
Since ®¯ is continuous and @®¯(0;a)@a < 1 and
@®¯(a;1)
@a < 1 where they are diﬀerentiable, iﬀ
2c > ±A®¯(0; 1) = ±AE(®), the communication with A is uninformative.
Proof. (of Proposition 4) Apply Lemma 2 and 3.
Proof. (of Proposition 5) Let B f0 = b0; ¢ ¢ ¢ bM = 1g be any partition elements. Given
this, let µ˜¤ and µ˜¤ be the upper bound and the lower bound of µ˜. The communication is
uninformative if
y(µ˜¤; µ˜¤)¡ y(µ˜¤) < 2cA:
Note that y(µ˜¤; µ˜¤) = E(±A®+±B¯) and y(µ˜¤) = ±B ¯¯(b1; 0). If for all B, the above inequality
holds, there does not exist informative equilibrium,
sup
b1
E(±A®+ ±B¯)¡ ±B ¯¯(b1; 0) = E(±A®+ ±B¯) < 2cA:
Appendix for Example 2 When agent B sends message (bi¡1; bi), then agent A
chooses y(t˜0; t˜1) with probability Pr(12® +
bi+bi¡1
4 · t˜1) = Pr(® · 2t˜1 ¡ bi+bi¡12 ). The
incentive compatible condition of agent B, when 1¡b14 · t˜1 · 12 + b14 is
Z 2t˜1¡ b12
0
½
y(t˜0; t˜1)¡ 12®¡
1
2
¯ ¡ cB
¾2
d®+
Z 1
2t˜¡ b1
2
½
y(t˜1; t˜2)¡ 12®¡
1
2
¯ ¡ cB
¾2
d®
=
Z 2t˜1¡ 1+b12
0
½
y(t˜0; t˜1)¡ 12®¡
1
2
¯ ¡ cB
¾2
d®+
Z 1
2t˜¡ 1+b1
2
½
y(t˜1; t˜2)¡ 12®¡
1
2
¯ ¡ cB
¾2
d®
, y(t˜0; t˜1) + y(t˜1; t˜2) = 2t˜¡ 1¡ 2b14 + 2cB:
Combined with (6), we obtain b1 =
1¡8(cB¡cA)
2 . There exists an informative equilibrium
such that b1 = 15 and t˜1 2 (1¡b14 ; 12 + b14 )
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